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I
INTRODUCTION
The rule in Florida,I as in most other jurisdictions, 2 is that generally an appeal
will lie only from a final judgment or order. This final judgment rule is of such
importance in Florida that it is embodied in provisions of the Florida Constitution
that confer a constitutional right to appeal from a final judgment or order, but
which authorize appellate review of interlocutory orders only where specifically
permitted by rules adopted by the Florida Supreme Court.
3
This rule, which restricts the right to seek immediate review of nonfinal or
interlocutory orders in civil cases, has great impact on the functioning of the trial
and appellate courts, including their relationship to each other.4 It also affects
interests vital to litigants.
This article will discuss the Florida law authorizing appellate review of final
and nonfinal orders. An attempt will be made to identify those interests or policies
which support the final judgment rule as well as those competing interests or poli-
cies which justify allowing interlocutory review of nonfinal orders.
An attempt will also be made to evaluate whether Florida's civil appellate law
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1. In Brannon v. Johnston, 83 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. 1955), the court stated: "Unless provision is made
by Rule or Statute for an appeal from an interlocutory order, it is the general rule to which we have
consistently adhered that an appeal will lie only from a final judgment or decree." To the same effect, see
Goldfarb v. Bronston, 154 Fla. 180, 17 So. 2d 300 (1944).
2. R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES § 3.1, at 52 (1981).
3. Article V, Section 4(b)(l) of the Florida Constitution provides that appeals may be taken as a
matter of right to the district courts of appeal from final judgments or orders of trial courts not directly
appealable to the Florida Supreme Court or a circuit court. Article V, Section 3(b)(2) confers jurisdiction
on the Florida Supreme Court to hear appeals from final judgments entered in bond validation proceed-
ings. Article V, Section 4(b)(1) also confers jurisdiction on the district courts of appeal to review interlocu-
tory orders to the extent provided by rules adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. Under Article V,
Section 5(b) and Section 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (1981), the legislature has conferred jurisdiction on the
circuit courts (trial courts of highest original jurisdiction) to review final orders of county courts (trial
courts of limited jurisdiction) except those declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state
constitution.
4. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
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properly balances the competing interests or policies involved. For purposes of this
discussion, the phrases "final judgment rule" and "final order rule" will be used
interchangeably to refer to the rule requiring finality, however defined, as a pre-
condition to appellate review. 5 As will be shown, the concept of a final order, from
which an appeal may be taken, includes orders that are not commonly considered
to be final judgments under res judicata or other doctrines.
II
HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
Our rule postponing appellate review until the entry of final judgment had its
origin in common law decisions involving the writ of error.6 In early English prac-
tice, the King's Bench used the writ of error as the method to review decisions of
other common law courts.7 Since the proceeding on the writ of error was appar-
ently regarded as a new action and not simply a continuation of the case in the
inferior court, 8 it was necessary to bring the whole record to the King's Bench
before the case could be reviewed. 9 Apparently, the nature of the record was such
that it was difficult for the trial court and the King's Bench to review its contents
simultaneously. 10 This was a significant reason behind the general rule that in
common law actions an appeal lies only from a final judgment.II
In equity, however, there was no such rule limiting appellate review to final
decrees.' 2 The procedure in equity was more flexible and the final judgment rule
was unsuited to its needs. 13
The English common law final judgment rule was accepted early in the United
States and applied to both legal and equitable actions.' 4 Its wide acceptance was
not based on reasons similar to those promulgated by the English common law
courts;' 5 rather, considerations of judicial economy and the need for prompt and
efficient resolution of disputes' 6 prompted American courts to adopt the final judg-
ment rule.
5. Rule 9.020(e) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure defines an "order" as a "decision, order,
judgment, decree or rule of a lower court . Florida Coast Bank v. Mayes, 430 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
6. Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Baxtir for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 541 (1932).
7. Id
8. Id. at 543.
9. Metcalfe's Case, 6 Coke 38a, 77 Eng. Rep. 119 (1615).
10. See id.
It. 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.19, at 211 (2d ed.
1982); Holhorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U.S. 262 (1893). The "single judicial unit theory"
finds its genesis in the same rationale that supports the final judgment rule.
12. See Crick, supra note 6, at 540-4 1.
13. Id. at 548.
14. Id at 549; McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 (1891).
15. At common law, the final judgment rule was never thought of as a means of preventing excessive
appeals. See Crick, supra note 6, at 540-44.
16. SeeMcLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 (1891); Frank, Requiem for the Fuzal judgment Rule, 45 TEx. L. REv.
292 (1967).
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III
POLICIES SUPPORTING THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
Maintaining the appropriate relationship between the trial and appellate
courts is one of the vital purposes of the final judgment rule.' 7 Being the court of
original jurisdiction, the trial court is responsible for making the initial determina-
tion of law regulating procedure and discovery, fashioning temporary remedies,
controlling the conduct of counsel, witnesses, parties, and disposing of the case by
settlement or trial in an orderly, just, and expeditious manner. In order to perform
these responsibilities, it is essential that the trial court be granted wide discretion
with regard to many rulings and ample authority to control the case. 8
Indiscriminately permitting immediate appeal of every trial court ruling not
only disrupts the trial court process, but also creates an intolerable intrusion by the
appellate court into the trial court's function, resulting in the appellate court
directing the trial judge in the conduct of each case. ' 9 This would impair not only
the proper functioning of the trial court, but also the proper functioning of the
appellate court.
In addition to fostering a proper relationship between the trial and appellate
courts, the final order rule serves to eliminate unnecessary delay, 20 expense,'2
duplication, 22 harassment, 23 waste, 24 and burden on the appellate court's docket' 5
necessarily incident to allowing unlimited interlocutory review of pretrial orders.
Moreover, postponing appellate review of most pretrial rulings avoids appel-
late court review of erroneous trial court rulings in cases where either the trial
court corrects its own error,26 a settlement is reached, 27 or the party suffering the
adverse ruling prevails in the litigation.28 Delaying appeal until final judgment
also allows the appellate court to review the challenged ruling with the entire case
17. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
18. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & J. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907, at 430
(1976).
19. See Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Girten v. Bouvier,
155 So. 2d 745, 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); C.G.J. Corp. v. Engel, 135 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1961); Taylor v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 131 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Beck v.
Barnett Nat'l Bank, 117 So. 2d 45, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
20. Hawaiian Inn of Daytona Beach, Inc. v. Snead Constr. Corp., 393 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.. 1978).
21. See I5 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & J. COOPER, supra note 18, § 3913, at 523.
22. Id
23. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); Hawaiian Inn of Daytona Beach, Inc. v.
Snead Constr. Corp., 393 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
24. See R. STERN, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 53.
25. See Frank, supra note 16, at 293; Sobieski, The Theoretical Foundations of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure, 45 TENN. L. REV. 161, 217 (1978). In fact, it is stated in Crick, supra note 6, at 539, that
"The policy behind this rule is said to be that it is the only way in which the appellate court can prevent
itself from being swamped with appeals."
26. The trial court has inherent authority to control its own interlocutory orders prior to final judg-
ment. North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1962).
27. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & J. COOPER, supra note 18, § 3907, at 431.
28. Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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in perspective, thereby permitting the appellate court to determine better whether
harmful error occurred. 29
Additionally, it has been observed that in most cases the substantive rights of
the parties are not affected until the final order is entered. 30 Moreover, in the
usual case, where the litigation period is short and the legal issues are relatively
simple, the final order rule works well on balance and avoids waste that would
result from a rule allowing excessive interlocutory review of pretrial rulings. 3'
IV
FINAL JUDGMENT RULE: DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS
Many Florida cases, particularly older ones, define a final judgment as an
order disposing of the entire controversy on the merits, leaving nothing but the
enforcement of that which has been determined.32 An exception to this definition
was recognized early with respect to orders finally determining a distinct and sepa-
rate branch of the controversy. 33 A further exception to this definition emerged in
cases holding that a dismissal of an action is a final order for appellate purposes
even though the dismissal is without prejudice and does not adjudicate the rights
of the parties for purposes of res judicata. 34
Perhaps because of the recognition that a dismissal without prejudice is a final
appealable order, the most prevalent and authoritative current definition of the
final order or judgment rule in Florida does not include a requirement of an adju-
dication on the merits but instead focuses on whether there has been an end to the
judicial labor in the cause. This definition of a final judgment or order is stated in
SL. T Warehouse Co. v. Webb,35 in the following words:
[T]he test employed by the appellate court to determine finality of an order, judgment or
decree is whether the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause,
and nothing further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination of the cause
as between the parties directly affected.
3 6
Appreciation of this definition has led courts to characterize the following
29. Id
30. Beck v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 117 So. 2d 45, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); see R. STERN, supra note
2, § 3.1, at 53.
31. SeeC. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 101, at 504 (4th ed. 1983); Frank, supra note 16,
at 293.
32. Gore v. Hansen, 59 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 1952); Hillsboro Plantation, Inc. v. Plunkett, 55 So. 2d
534, 536 (Fla. 1951); Howard v. Ziegler, 40 So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. 1949); Alderman v. Puritan Dairy, Inc.,
145 Fla. 292, 295, 199 So. 44, 45 (Fla. 1940); State Road Dep't v. Crill, 99 Fla. 1012, 1017, 128 So. 412, 414
(Fla. 1930).
33. State Road Dep't v. Crill, 99 Fla. 1012, 1015, 128 So. 412, 414 (Fla. 1930) ("there is authority to
support the proposition that where a distinct and separate branch of the cause is finally determined,
although the suit is not ended, there may be an appeal .... ").
34. Derma Lift Salon, Inc. v. Swanko, 419 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1982); Boeing Co. v.
Merchant, 397 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Gibbs v. Trudeau, 283 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
35. 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).
36. Referring to this definition of a final judgment or order, the Florida Supreme Court stated in
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 1977), "We
have held steadfastly to this definition . . . we are not convinced that a change of the rule is necessary
although application in some cases is difficult." In Cowles v. Phares, 430 So.2d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) the court held that absent the entry of a written final order or judgment, the judicial labor in the
lower tribunal has not been completed.
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holdings as final appealable orders: an order setting aside an arbitration award in
favor of an insurer and directing rearbitration and fixing liability for attorney
fees, 3 7 an order enforcing settlement,38 and an order denying a petition for
intervention.39
On the other hand, under this "end of judicial labor" definition an order
leaving an issue open for further determination, such as the amount of rental
arrearages, 40 interest, 4' or damages,4 2 is not a final order because the judicial labor
has not concluded. Reservation of the right to tax costs43 or attorney fees 44 after
the entry of the final judgment, however, does not affect its finality for appellate
purposes.
V
WORDS OF FINALITY
Under the "end of judicial labor" definition of finality, the trial court is
required to use language in its order that conclusively demonstrates that judicial
labor has ended. Difficulties in doing this have been experienced by Florida trial
courts mainly where the order was in favor of the defendant. The "magic words"
determining finality are, of course, that the plaintiff "take nothing by this suit, and
the defendant go hence without day."' 45 Such magic words are not always
required. Any equivalent words that have the effect of dismissing the action
against the defendant will suffice. 46
The mere granting of a motion for summary judgment, 4 7 a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, 48 or a motion to dismiss, 49 however, without any further
words dismissing the complaint or action, will not be sufficient to render the order
final and appealable. And, although there is a conflict of opinion on the issue, it
has been held that an order granting a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint with
37. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 386 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
38. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Walker, 401 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
39. Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 398 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
40. Morton v. City of Miami Beach, 376 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). See also Heritage Paper
Co. v. Farah, 440 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (amount of unpaid commissions).
41. Chipola Nurseries, Inc. v. Division of Admin., State Dep't of Transp., 335 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976).
42. Brannon v. Johnston, 83 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1955).
43. Roberts v. Askew, 260 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1972).
44. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Kellin, 391 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
45. Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792, 793, 135 So. 561, 562 (1931);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Collier, 405 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
46. Slatcoff v. Dezen, 72 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1954) ("and the garnishee be discharged from this
cause"); Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Austin Carpet Serv., Inc., 382 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (plaintiffs "request for distribution of proceeds is denied").
47. Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, Inc., 99 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Danford v. City of
Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Arline v. Wometco Enter. 429 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983). But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Coller, 405 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
48. Sgrignuoili v. Barakat, 384 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
49. Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980): Atria v. Anton, 379 So.
2d 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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prejudice, but not actually dismissing the complaint, is not a final appealable
order. 50
VI
ORDERS DISMISSING LESS THAN ALL CLAIMS OR PARTIES IN A CASE
A. Multiple Claims
Generally, a case is held to be a single judicial unit, even though it involves
multiple claims or more than two parties. 5i An order of dismissal disposing of less
than all of the claims is considered to be a nonfinal order for appellate purposes.
-52
An exception to this single judicial unit rule has been recognized in the leading
case of Afendez v. West Flagler Family Assocmtzon, 53 recognizing that an order dis-
missing a distinct and severable claim arising out of a transaction or set of facts
which is separate from and not legally interrelated with the remaining claims is
final. 54 The reason given in Mendez for this exception is that there is no "advan-
tage to be gained in terms of court time and labor in not allowing" the dismissed
claim to be appealed immediately.55
The best explanation supporting this reasoning appears to be as follows: If the
dismissed claim involves facts and issues different from those of the remaining
claims and is not so interrelated with the remaining claims that a trial of the dis-
missed claim will require litigating substantially the same facts and issues as those
involved in the remaining claims, a reversal of the dismissal will not result in
having to relitigate substantially the same facts and issues. Therefore, delaying the
trial of the remaining claims, until appeal of the dismissal is decided, is not neces-
sary in order to avoid duplication. Conversely, where an interrelated claim is dis-
missed, the trial court, to avoid duplication, would have to choose between
delaying the trial on the remaining claims until the appeal of the dismissal is
decided or risk the possibility of having to try substantially the same facts and
issues twice.
The wisdom of requiring an immediate appeal of the dismissal of a distinct and
severable claim as mandated in Mendez is, however, subject to question. A major
difficulty is that in many cases it will be difficult to determine from the state of the
record at the time of the dismissal whether the claim in question involves separate
or interrelated transactions and facts. If the dismissed claim is in fact distinct and
severable, the plaintiff must appeal the dismissal immediately or lose his right to
appeal the dismissal. This creates a strong incentive to file protective appeals in
50. Lawler v. Harris, 418 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Gries Inv. Co. v. Cheton, 388 So. 2d
1281, 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Contra Cordani v. Roulis, 395 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Segal v. Garrigues, 329 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
51. S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974); Goldfarb v. Bronston, 154 Fla. 180,
184, 17 So. 2d 300, 302 (1944).
52. S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d at 99; Goldfarb v. Bronston, 154 Fla. at 185, 17 So. 2d
at 302.
53. 303 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974).
54. Id
55. Id.
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order to avoid the risk of losing the right to appeal, and there is evidence that the
rule in Mendez has generated such protective appeals. 5
It has been suggested that such protective appeals are avoidable by allowing
the plaintiff the option of appealing from the dismissal immediately or waiting
until the entire case is concluded by a final judgment. 57 This suggestion has been
adopted in an amendment to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure which
becomes effective on January 1, 1985, the text of which is set forth bnfra in the
discussion of Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although this
suggestion has some merit, it would allow the plaintiff to determine unilaterally
whether to delay the ultimate disposition of the dismissed claim. Delay, however,
affects the rights of the defendant as well. Moreover, avoiding unnecessary delay is
the keystone to proper caseload management.5 8 The decision whether an appeal
should be delayed should therefore be a judicial one.
The question whether there is good reason to delay an appeal of an order dis-
missing a severable and distinct claim requires an evaluation of many variables.
The trial date in a given case may be only months away when the order of dis-
missal is entered. The legal issue on which the dismissal is entered may be a close
one and events in the case subsequent to the dismissal may cause the court to
reconsider and correct its erroneous dismissal if the jurisdiction to do so has not
been lost. There also may be a possibility that the parties will settle the case or
that the plaintiff will win on his pending claims and be satisfied or lose on his
pending claims for reasons that convince him that he could not prevail at trial on
the dismissed claim.
The possibility that the case will be terminated without the necessity of an
appeal of the dismissal may justify a short delay in allowing the appeal. On the
other hand, the trial date may be years away and the disadvantages of delaying
the appeal may greatly outweigh competing considerations. These are but some of
the variables illustrating that under some circumstances a dismissal of a severable
and distinct claim should be subject to immediate appeal and that under others
such right to appeal should be delayed until the remaining claims are disposed
of.59 The above considerations suggest that a better solution than that provided in
Mendez is needed to determine when an appeal of a dismissal of a distinct and
severable claim should be permitted.
B. Orders Dismissing Claims against Some But Not All of the Parties
Another exception to the single judicial unit rule has been made for orders
dismissing fewer than all of the parties, even where the claims involved are not
severable as required in Mendez. Although statements can be found in some of the
56. See e.g., One Thousand Oaks, Inc. v. Dade Say. & Loan Ass'n, 417 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Thomson v. Petherbridge, 406 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Fetters v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.,
399 So. 2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Venezia A., Inc. v. Askew, 314 So. 2d 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
57. Haddad, ParttalFitalJudgmenis, 53 FLA. B.J. 204, 207 (1979).
58. See CHURCH, CARLSON, LEE, AND TAN, JUSTICE DELAY-ED! THE PACE F1- LITIGATION IN URBAN
TRIAL COURTS, (National Center for State Courts Publication No. R0041A, 1978).
59. See generally the discussion of policies supporting the final judgment rule, supra text accompa-
nying notes 17-31.
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earlier cases that severability of claims against multiple parties is a factor in deter-
mining the finality of an order dismissing some but not all of the parties,60 this is
apparently no longer the law. The cases now routinely hold that where a dismissal
totally disposes of the case between the parties affected by it, it is a final appealable
order, even though the dismissed and pending claims involve interrelated facts and
issues. 6 ' The reason given for this rule is that such dismissal constitutes an end to
the judicial labor on the claim between the affected parties. 62
The advantages of this rule are its simplicity and certainty, but it too has
serious disadvantages. Unlike the Mendez rule, this rule forces the trial court to
make a choice between delay and duplication where interrelated facts and issues
are involved. If the trial court wishes to try the interrelated facts and issues only
once, it must wait until the appeal of the dismissed claim is concluded before
trying the case against the remaining parties. Otherwise, if there is a reversal, the
interrelated facts and issues will have to be retried in a second trial between the
parties to the dismissed claim.
Moreover, where the claims are for the same damages, a plaintiff successful
against the remaining parties will often have no need to appeal the dismissal. This
is true whether the plaintiff is successful by way of settlement or trial. This rule
requiring an immediate appeal of the dismissal of a party does not permit the trial
court to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of delaying the appeal of the
dismissal. 63
VII
FEDERAL RULE 54(B)
As shown above, the rules requiring an immediate appeal from orders dis-
missing distinct and severable claims or some but not all of the parties to the case
do not permit a determination to be made in the individual case as to whether
there are good reasons to delay an immediate appeal from such orders. Moreover,
the difficulty in determining whether a claim is distinct and severable from
pending claims leads to protective appeals.
As a means of remedying the problem of determining when to appeal a partial
final judgment and codifying in rule form the requirement of an immediate appeal
from orders dismissing some but not all of the parties to a case, the Florida
60. See, e.g., Hillsboro Plantation, Inc. v. Plunkett, 55 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1951); Evin R. Welch & Co. v.
Johnson, 138 So. 2d 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
61. See, e.g., Hotel Roosevelt Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 192 So. 2d 334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Leeward & Hart Aeronautical Corp. v. South Cent. Airlines, Inc., 184 So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966). Both of these cases were cited with approval in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Hard-
ware Mut. Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 1977). See also City of St. Petersburg v. Circuit Court of the
Sixth judicial Circuit, 422 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Windhover Ass'n v. Gulf Oil Realty, 407
So.2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Logan v. Flood, 346 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
62. Niesz v. R. P. Morgan Bldg. Co., 401 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). However, an
order dismissing two of the named defendants with leave to amend did not constitute an end to the judicial
labor. Braddon v. Doran Jason Co., 8 F.L.W. 2546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Oct. 18, 1983).
63. See discussion relating to the considerations underlying the final judgment rule, supra text accom-
panying notes 17-31.
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Supreme Court has added subsection (k) to Rule 9.110 of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure:
(k) Except as otherwise provided herein, partial final judgments are reviewable either on
appeal from the partial final judgment or on appeal from the final judgment in the entire
case. If a partial final judgment totally. disposes of an entire case as to any party, it must be
appealed within thirty days of rendition.
6 4
It is suggested that a better rule to govern the appealability of such orders would
be one comparable to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 65 which
provides:
Judgment upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Partes. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counter-claim, crossclaim, or third-party
claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities
of all the parties.
Although Federal Rule 54(b) does not provide a perfect solution to the problems
involved in determining the appealability of orders dismissing fewer than all of the
claims and parties in a suit, 6 6 it does provide, on balance, a better solution than
that currently available under Florida law.
VIII
ORDERS PERMITTING OR DENYING CLASS ACTIONS
The Florida Supreme Court recently held that an order holding that certain
parties were proper members of a plaintiff class in a class action suit is a nonfinal
order that does not determine jurisdiction of the person within the meaning of
Florida Appellate Rule 9.130(a)(3)(i), authorizing interlocutory review of orders
determining jurisdiction of the person.6 7 The reasoning supporting the court's
holding in this case would also exclude orders allowing a class action to be main-
tained from the category of nonfinal orders determining jurisdiction of the person
64. This and other recommendations were contained in a petition of the Florida Bar Appellate Rules
Committee filed in the Florida Supreme Court on March 28, 1984. In accordance with these recommenda-
tions, the Florida Supreme Court approved certain changes to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,
effective January 1, 1985. See Rules of Appellate Procedure - Amendment, 9 F.L.W. 369 (Fla. Sup. Ct:,
Sept. 13, 1984).
65. The principles governing the applicability of Rule 54(b) are set forth in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956). For an
excellent discussion of Rule 54(b), see J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, & J. WICKER, supra note 11, at § 54.01.
The use of Rule 54(b) was rejected by the Appellate Rules Committee of the Florida Bar as a method of
coping with the uncertainties created by Mender.
66. See Haddad, supra note 57, at 207; 6 J. MOORE, W, TAGGART & J. WICKER, supra note 11, at
§ 54.4315]. See also Taussig v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 301 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
("Inherent in the adoption of the rule [54(b)] were the competing policy considerations of the inconven-
ience and cost of a piecemeal review on one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the
other.").
67. National Lake Devs., Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n, 417 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1982).
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under the above rule. 68
The Florida Supreme Court has not yet expressly determined whether an order
denying class action status is a final order. The First District Court of Appeal of
Florida, however, has held, in Cordell v. World Insurance Co.69 and in two other
cases, 70 that an order denying class action status is a final order. In Cordell, the
court held that although such an order did not "finally dispose of the case it was
final as to the proposed class."7 1 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
the case of Shute v. Keystone State Bank,72 holding that an order dismissing less than
all defendants is a final order, and the case of Mendez v. West Flagler Family Associa-
tion,73 holding that the dismissal of a distinct and severable claim is a final order.
The Cordell court's reliance on Mendez seems clearly inappropriate because Rule
1.220 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes class actions that include
claims that are interrelated as opposed to severable as those terms are defined in
Mendez.74 This rule permits a class action where "the claim or defense of the repre-
sentative party raises questions of law or fact common to the questions of law or
fact raised by the claim or defense of each member of the class." '7 5
Moreover, the court's reliance on the rule which holds that a dismissal of less
than all of the defendants is a final order is questionable. Apart from the fact that
the wisdom of this rule itself is debatable as discussed previously in this article, it is
somewhat strange to say that a potential member of a class who has not yet
become a party to the action has suffered a dismissal of his claim by an order
denying class action status. This is particularly true where the potential class
member may not even choose to be included in the class. As stated in National Lake
Developments, Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Association, "Unlike a defendant who
cannot unilaterally withdraw from the jurisdiction of the court, the members of
the plaintiff class may choose not to be members and thus not be bound by the
judgment. '76
Although not relied on in Cordell, the rule that an order denying intervention is
a final appealable order7 7 might be urged in support of the Cordell holding. How-
ever, a person seeking to intervene in litigation has expressed his active interest in
being a party to the case, whereas a potential class member may or may not have
such an interest.
These technical objections to the holding of Cordell, however, are not the most
important ones. Whether an order granting or denying class action status should
68. Id at 657.
69. 352 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
70. Smith v. Atlantic Boat Builder Co., 356 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Cordell v.
World Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The Third District Court of Appeal has
followed Cordelt in Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 452 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
71. 352 So. 2d at 109.
72. 159 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
73. 303 So. 2d I (Fla. 1974).
74. Id at 5.
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a).
76. 417 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla. 1982).
77. Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 398 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
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be subject to interlocutory review is problematic. 8 As argued in Coopers &Lybrand
v. Livesy, 79 which held that an order denying class action status is not a final order,
the class action serves a vital public interest and should be governed by special
rules of appellate review to guarantee that trial courts receive adequate supervi-
sion and control with respect to their decisions permitting or denying class action
status.8 0 The appealability of trial court decisions denying class action status
should be determined by rules which evaluate the important policies involved in
such determinations, and not by reliance on technical rules of finality that fail to
weigh and balance these policies.
IX
SEPARABLE AND COLLATERAL ORDERS
An order entered during the pendency of an action, which determines the sub-
stantive rights of the parties affected by the order and which is sufficiently sepa-
rable from and collateral to the main proceeding may constitute a final order.8 '
Similar principles have been applied in holding that certain orders entered in a
case after entry of final judgment are appealable.8 2
An analogous rule is followed in probate and guardianship cases. These pro-
ceedings are often prolonged and involve a series of orders, some of which may
effectively determine the rights of outside parties.83 In recognition of the special
nature of probate and guardianship proceedings, Rule 5.100 of the Florida Rules
of Probate and Guardianship Procedure provides the following:
All orders and judgments of the court determining rights of any party in any particular
proceeding in the administration of the estate of a decedent or ward shall be deemed final
and may, as a matter of right, be appealed to the appropriate district court of appeal ...
The test of finality under this rule is whether the "order is such as to clearly
manifest that the right of the party aggrieved has been finally determined and all
judicial labor regarding the matter in controversy has been completed. '84
78. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & J. COOPER, supra note 18, § 3912, at 522.
79. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
80. Id at 470.
81. In Hatch v. Minot, 369 So. 2d 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the court found to be final an order
entered in an eminent domain proceeding directing the mortgagors to pay to the mortgagee funds which
were deposited into the registry of the court by the condemning authority and withdrawn by the mort-
gagor. The court concluded that such an order "was a final determination of a particular matter which
had a character distinct and independent from the original action and which, therefore, was separable
from and collateral to that action." Id at 975. See also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 54
(1949).
82. For examples of post judgment orders held to be final, see Small v. Small, 313 So. 2d 749 (Fla.
1975) (order denying modification of divorce judgment with respect to alimony); Shannon v. Shannon, 136
So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (order granting former wife's petition that her former husband be
required to contribute his share of the costs of improvements of the family home); Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc.,
104 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (order holding that property owner was entitled to the possession
of the premises as of the date of the final decree).
83. In re Estate of Cook, 245 So. 2d 694, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
84. In re Estate of Herlan, 239 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); see also In re Estate of
Beeman, 391 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Cook v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of
Sarasota, 245 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); In re Estate of Nolan, 114 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
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X
POLICIES JUSTIFYING INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF NONFINAL ORDERS
The final order rule, however, is not invariably just or efficient. In certain
circumstances, permitting interlocutory review of a pretrial order may be desirable
in order to prevent irreparable harm, 5 unwitting forfeiture of the right to appel-
late review, 6 or unnecessary delay, expense, and inconvenience resulting from
unwarranted and fruitless litigation."7
Allowing interlocutory review can, in some circumstances, reduce delay in the
ultimate determination of a case,88 lead to the development of the law on pretrial
issues not ordinarily reviewable on appeal from a final judgment,8 9 provide
needed guidance to the trial court, particularly in protracted litigation,9° and sat-
isfy the necessity of immediate review of severable issues of such a nature that
there would be no advantage in delaying their review.91
These policies can, of course, conflict with the policies supporting the final
order rule. Courts have usually attempted to avoid, or at least reduce, this conflict
by allowing interlocutory appeal as of right of specified categories of nonfinal
orders and discretionary interlocutory review of other nonfinal orders which satisfy
certain criteria.92 Florida follows this pattern.
XI
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS OF NONFINAL ORDERS
Article V, Section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the Florida
Supreme Court to promulgate rules permitting review by the district courts of
appeal of interlocutory orders. 93 The 1977 revision of the Florida Rules of Appel-
late Procedure governs interlocutory appeals from nonfinal orders under Article V,
Section 4(b)(1). This revision of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure made
substantial changes in the former rules of appellate procedure regulating interlocu-
tory review of nonfinal orders.
The 1977 Revision of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure abrogated
85. Note, Interlocutory Appeals zn the Federal Courts Under 28 US. C 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REL. 607, 609
(1975); American Bar Association Standards Relating to Appellate Review, § 3.12, at 27 (1977).
86. In Doctor's Hospital of Hollywood, Inc. v. Madison, 411 So. 2d 190, 192 (Fla. 1982), the Florida
Supreme Court stated, "An interpretation preventing unwitting forfeiture of a right to appeal is preferable
to one which permits such." See also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
87. See National Lake Devs., Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n, 417 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla. 1982),
wherein the court stated,"[i]t is true that avoidance of unnecessary inconvenience and expense, for litigants
and for courts, is one of the reasons for allowing certain interlocutory appeals ..... See also Sobieski,
supra note 25, at 220.
88. See R. STERN, supra note 2, § 3. , at 54; Frank, supra note 16, at 293.
89. Note, supra note 85, at 609.
90. Frank, supra note 16, at 293.
91. C. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 504-05.
92. Sobieski, supra note 25, at 221.
93. Article V, Section 4(b)(l) of the Florida Constitution (1968 Revision) provides, in pertinent part,
that "District courts of appeal ... may review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by
rules adopted by the Supreme Court."
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provisions of the Florida Appellate Rules, 1962 Revision, as amended, 94 which
authorized interlocutory appeals from all orders entered in civil actions formerly
cognizable in equity95 and which permitted the trial court to certify to the appel-
late court questions of law that were "determinative of the cause and . . . without
controlling precedent in this state."'96 This abrogation represented a shift in policy
in favor of the final order rule by limiting interlocutory review as of right.
Rule 4.2(a) of the Florida Appellate Rules, 1962 Revision, as amended, which
allowed interlocutory appeals from orders granting partial summary judgment on
liability in civil actions was replaced by Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 1977 Revision. The new rule allows interlocutory
appeal of orders "determining liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative
relief."' 97 The new rule is more expansive in one manner than the old one since it
includes all orders determining liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative
relief rather than just orders granting partial summary judgment on liability.
The intent of the present appellate rules authorizing interlocutory appeals is to
minimize interruption of the trial court proceedings resulting from interlocutory
appeals by providing for an expedited method of review. The changes associated
with the expedited review include the substituting of an appendix in lieu of a
record, requiring appellant's brief accompanied by an appendix to be filed within
fifteen days of the filing of the notice of appeal, and permitting the trial court, in
the absence of a stay, to proceed with the case short of entering a final order.98 By
rules limiting interlocutory appeals to the "most urgent interlocutory orders," 99
interruption of trial court proceedings is minimized further.
Rule 9.130 authorizes interlocutory appeals to be taken to the district courts of
appeal and circuit courts sitting in their appellate capacity from the following
nonfinal orders: orders which (1) concern venue; t° ° (2) grant, continue, modify,
deny or dissolve injunctions;i °i (3) determine jurisdiction of the person;10 2 (4)
94. See amendments effective October 1, 1968, 211 So. 2d 198, and effective September 30, 1970, 237
So. 2d 138.
95. Fla. App. R. 4.2(a) (1962 Revision), as amended in 211 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1970).
96. Id. 4.6; see Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Parker, 417 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
97. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) (1977 Revision). The underlying purpose behind this rule is to
afford a party who is being sued a right to an immediate appeal from a court order which imposes liability
upon him without a trIal. Dauer v. Freed, 444 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Hubbart, J., concur-
ring). To deny such a defendant his constitutional right to a trial and impose liability upon him by court
order "is a serious and far-reaching judicial act which in all fairness should be made immediately appeal-
able." Id
98. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 committee notes (1977 Revision).
99. Id
100. The court in Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 417 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), stated
in dicta that Rule 9.130(a)(3)(A) applies only to orders concerning venue within the State of Florida.
101. See, e.g., DeLisi v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Department of Business
Regulation, Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. Provende, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
102. In American Health Ass'n v. Helprin, 357 So. 2d 204, 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), jurisdiction
of the person was held to refer to orders pertaining to service of process or the applicability of the long arm
statute to nonresidents. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation in National Lake
Devs., Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n, 417 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla. 1982). The court in Keehn v.
Joseph C. Mackey & Co., 420 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) held that an order denying a
motion to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that the corporation lost its capacity to sue was not an order
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determine the right to immediate possession of property;t0 3 (5) determine the right
to immediate monetary relief or child custody in domestic relations matters; 0 4 (6)
determine liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief; 0 5 (7) grant
motions for new trial in jury and nonjury cases; 0 6 (8) pass on motions filed under
Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; 0 7 and (9) other nonfinal
orders entered after final order on authorized motions. 10 8 Effective January 1,
determining jurisdiction of the person under Rule 1.930(a)(3)(C)(i). See also Page v. Ezell, 452 So. 2d 582
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (order denying a motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity nonap-
pealable under Rule 9.130(3)).
103. This provision, Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii), was held applicable to an order of taking which gives a
condemning authority the right to take possession and title to real property in advance of final judgment.
Niles v. County of Volusia, 405 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also to the same effect, FLA. R.
App. P. 9.130 committee notes (1977 Revision). On the other hand, it has been held that this provision
does not apply to an order appointing a receiver, on the grounds that the provision "refers to possession by
a party with an adverse interest and not to possession by the court." Mann v. Stein, 379 So. 2d 978 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Compare, however, Forgay v, Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848), holding that an order
immediately transferring property to a trustee in bankruptcy was a final appealable order, although an
accounting of the rents had yet to be determined by the trial court.
104. See, e.g., Agudo v. Agudo, 411 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (an order which changed the
temporary "residence" of a daughter from the mother to the father was held to be an order determining
right to custody and thus reviewable under Rule 9.130 (a)(3)(C)(iii)).
105. An order denying a motion to vacate a default has been held to be an order determining liability
in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief, reviewable under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv). Doctor's Hosp. of
Hollywood, Inc. v. Madison, 411 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1982). An order determining insurance coverage, entered
before a determination of liability on the part of the insured defendant, is an order not subject to interlocu-
tory appeal under this rule. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Burns, 429 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). How-
ever, such an order may be reviewed by certiorari. Sunshine Dodge, Inc. v. Ketchem, 427 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984). The purpose of this rule is to afford a party who is being sued a right to an immediate
appeal from a court order which imposes liability upon him without a trial. Dauer v. Freed, 444 So. 2d 1012
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Hubbart, J., concurring). It is doubtful whether an order directing a verdict for
the plaintiff entered in a bifurcated trial at the conclusion of the trial on liability would be appealable. Id
Florida Courts have held, however, that under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(iv) a defendant has the right to appeal
an adverse summary judgment on liability which has been entered against him without a trial, Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Meyer, 385 So. 2d 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), or an order denying a motion to
vacate a default, Sunny South Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. Inversiones, 1120 C.A., 417 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1982);
Doctor's Hosp. of Hollywood, Inc. v. Madison, 411 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1982).
106. An order granting a new trial is reviewable by the method prescribed in Rule 9.110, which is the
method provided for appeal from final orders. The Committee Notes to Rule 9.110, reported in In re
Emergency Amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370, 1381 (Fla. 1980), state: "This
rule is intended to clarify the procedure for review of orders granting a new trial. Rules 9.130(a)(4) and
9.140(c) (1)(C) authorize the appeal of orders granting a motion for a new trial. Under Section (h) of this
rule the scope of review of the Court is not necessarily limited to the order granting a new trial. The
Supreme Court has held that 'appeals taken from new trial orders shall be treated as appeals from final
judgments to the extent possible .... ' Bowen v. Willard, 340 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla. 1976). This rule
implements this decision."
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) provides, in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, decree, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing; (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment or decree is void; (5) the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released or discharged or a
prior judgment or decree upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective application
See, e.g., Potucek v. Smeja, 419 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. Weede, 433 So. 2d 992
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
108. See, e.g., Mogul v. Fodiman, 406 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Rule 9.130(a)(4));
cf. Peterson v. Peterson, 429 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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1985, Rule 9.130 will be amended to provide also that nonfinal orders determining
"whether a party is entitled to arbitration" are also appealable. In addition to the
foregoing, Rule 9.100(d)(l) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 1977
Revision, provides for immediate interlocutory review of trial court orders
excluding the press or public from access to "any proceeding, any part of a pro-
ceeding, or any judicial records, if the proceedings or records are not required by
law to be confidential . . . ." This rule implements the requirement of "strict pro-
cedural safeguards," required by the United States Supreme Court for activities
protected by the First Amendment. 10 9
The objectives implemented by allowing an interlocutory appeal from the non-
final orders specified in Rule 9.130 appear to be as follows: (a) prevention of the
risk of irreparable harm resulting from decisions concerning the right to immediate
possession of property, the right to immediate monetary relief or child custody in
domestic relations cases and injunctions; (b) recognition of the traditional value of
allowing early review where the trial court's legal authority is questioned so as to
avoid the wastefulness of needless proceedings resulting from an erroneous ruling
on venue or jurisdiction over the person; 110 (c) avoidance of the waste involved in
trying a case only on damages where the court has erroneously determined liability
in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief; (d) prevention of an improper denial
of the constitutionally protected right to trial;" 1I (e) avoidance of the burden and
expense of a needless trial resulting from an order erroneously granting a new trial;
and (f) provision of a method of appellate review of nonfinal orders under Rule
1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or under other rules authorizing
nonfinal orders after entry of final judgment or order.
The advantage of designating specific types of orders from which an interlocu-
tory appeal can be taken as of right is that it provides certainty as to which orders
are subject to interlocutory appeal, an advantage not present with a case by case
method. 1 2 The disadvantage of this approach is that appellate review is per-
mitted automatically for all orders within a designated category, which may
include many orders not worthy of interlocutory review when considered on their
individual merits. "13
109. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977); see FLA. R. App.
P. 9.100 committee notes (1977 Revision). See, e.g., State ex rel Pensacola News-Journal, Inc. v. Fleet, 388
So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State ex rel Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Cooksey, 371 So. 2d 207
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
110. National Lake Devs., Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n, 417 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1982).
111. "The requirement that the absence of triable issues be shown conclusively [before the granting of
a summary judgment] is not new . . . . This conclusive showing is justified because the summary judg-
ment procedure is necessarily in derogation of the constitutionally protected right to trial." Holl v. Talcott,
191 So. 2d 40, 48 (Fla. 1966).
112. Sobieski, supra note 25, at 222.
113. Id
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XII
OTHER METHODS OF INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
A. The Writ of Mandamus
Extraordinary writs, such as the writ of mandamus, are available in limited
circumstances to obtain interlocutory review of trial court orders. The writ of
mandamus is used, however, only in extraordinary situations to avoid defeating
the sound purposes of the final order rule."14 Thus, mandamus is generally
unavailable unless no other adequate remedy exists.' 5
An exception to the general rule restricting the use of mandamus is recognized
for certain cases presenting jurisdictional issues. In Wincor v. Turner,' ' 6 the Florida
Supreme Court stated:
Respondent argues that, inasmuch as the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law,
namely prohibition, mandamus would not lie. In this connection, it should be borne in
mind that both prohibition and mandamus are legal remedies and in many instances have
been used interchangeably. Prohibition is designed to prevent the exercise of unlawful juris-
diction and is negative in nature, whereas mandamus is a writ designed to compel the
performance of some ministerial act, often one requiring a court to dismiss actions where
such dismissal is required because of intervening events or because the court is about to proceed lh
excess of its jurisdict'on. (emphasis added)" '7
One court declared another exception in Sarasota Manatee Airport v. Alderman,'"8
allowing both mandamus and common law certiorari as remedies to review a trial
court decision denying the right to jury trial on an issue.' 19
Where no other adequate remedy exists, except as qualified above, mandamus
is available to compel a trial court to perform a ministerial act required by law
and involving no exercise of discretion. 2 0 If the judicial decision involves the exer-
cise of some element of discretion, such as the decision whether to approve the
settlement of a minor's claim, mandamus will not lie.' 2'
To be entitled to relief under the writ of mandamus, the petitioner must, in
addition to the requirement of lack of other remedy, establish the existence of a
clear legal right on his part and an indisputable legal duty on the part of the
respondent. 2 2 The legal right which the petitioner seeks to enforce by mandamus
must already be established clearly; mandamus is not a proper remedy to establish
114. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 102, at 715.
115. Shevin ex rel. State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1976); Sturdivant v. Blanchard,
422 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
116. 215 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1968).
117. Id. at 5.
118. 238 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
119. Id at 679. See also Suntogs of Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983). Mandamus has been used in the federal courts to require a jury trial where it was improperly
denied. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 358 U.S. 500, 511 (1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 479-80 (1962).
120. Wincor v. Turner, 215 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 1968); Federated Stores Realty, Inc. v. Burnstein, 392 So.
2d 573, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
121. Bullard v. Sharp, 407 So. 2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
122. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Hartsfield, 399 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
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the existence of a legal right in the first instance. 23 Mandamus is also unavailable
to correct trial court errors of procedure or judgment which do not satisfy the
above principles. 124
Illustrative of the proper use of the writ of mandamus is an appellate court
ordering a trial court to exercise its rightful jurisdiction over a case' 25 or to render
a decision in a case.126 The limitations stated above will prevent the widespread
use of the writ. Fortunately, as a result of its limited function, the writ of man-
damus has not been used to unduly intrude into trial court proceedings in viola-
tion of the policies underlying the final order rule.
B. The Writ of Prohibition
The basic principles governing the writ of prohibition in Florida were set forth
in Englsh v. McCrary,12 7 and are as follows: Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
issued by an appellate court to prevent a lower court from exceeding its subject
matter jurisdiction.' 28 The writ is preventative, and not corrective, in that it is
available to prevent a future exercise of jurisdiction over a matter not within the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, but is not available to revoke an order already
entered or to compel the undoing of something already done. 129 Prohibition does
not lie to prevent a lower court from erroneously deciding a matter within its
jurisdiction; such errors must be corrected by appeal or, where proper, by common
law certiorari.130 Moreover, where a court's jurisdiction depends upon a fact which
it is required to ascertain, the court's determination of the existence or nonexis-
tence of such fact is conclusive on the question of jurisdiction until set aside or
reversed by direct proceedings. 131
Prohibition is unavailable to prevent a court's improper exercise of jurisdiction
over a party, for two reasons. First, prohibition is available only where there is no
123. Id See also Slaughter v. State ex rel. Harrell, 245 So. 2d 126, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
124. Chapnick v. Hare, 394 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
125. State ex rel. Locke v. Sandier, 23 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 1945); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So. 2d 318,
319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
126. Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Testa, 429 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Chapman Realty Corp. v.
Madeira Management, Inc., 414 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see also A.B.C. Business Forms, Inc.
v. Spaet, 201 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1977) (mandamus available to require trial court to exercise its judicial
discretion as to whether to grant a motion for continuance and to disregard statute which unconstitution-
ally required the trial court automatically to grant members of the legislature a continuance even where a
request for emergency relief was involved).
127. 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
128. Id. at 296; School Bd. v. Angel, 404 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
129. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d at 296; see also State ex rel. Dep't. of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Upchurch, 394 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Baptiste v. Johnson, 434 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983).
130. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d at 298; see also Lawrence v. Orange County, 404 So. 2d 421 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
131. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d at 298. See, however, Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161, 163
(Fla. 1983), in which the Florida Supreme Court held that prohibition would lie to review a trial court
order allegedly denying a right to speedy trial. Chief Justice Alderman pointed out in his dissent that
determining whether there has been a speedy trial rule violation "requires a fact finding to some degree."
Id. at 165.
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other appropriate and adequate legal remedy, 132 and Rule 9.130 of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides an adequate legal remedy by way of inter-
locutory appeal of orders determining jurisdiction of the person. 33 Second,
regardless of the appellate rules, the common law does not permit the use of prohi-
bition (except where a court is attempting to exercise jurisdiction over a person not
served by process or who does not submit himself to the court's jurisdiction by
voluntary appearance or waiver) 134 to challenge a court's jurisdiction over a
party. 135
Courts use prohibition to review, initeraha, trial court decisions in which: a trial
judge refuses to disqualify himself,136 a trial court attempts to conduct contempt
proceedings to punish a party for acts which do not constitute contempt, 37 or a
trial court premises its order on a prior void order. 13 Prohibition is also available
to prevent a trial court from exercising jurisdiction over a governmental entity
entitled to sovereign immunity. 139
As stated in Enghsh v. McCray, the writ of prohibition is "extremely narrow in
scope and operation"' 40 and will be invoked "only in emergency cases to forestall
an impending present injury .... -141 Consequently, the writ of prohibition does
not appear to undermine, in any substantial fashion, the sound policies of the final
order rule. 142
C. The Writ of Common Law Certiorari 43
Some types of interlocutory orders, other than those from which statutes and
rules authorize interlocutory appeal, are subject to review under the writ of
common law certiorari. This writ, however, is not used to circumvent the policies
which underlie the rules governing interlocutory appeals 44 and the final order
132. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d at 297. Both mandamus and prohibition may be used in some
cases involving jurisdictional issues. See Wincor v. Turner, 215 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 1968).
133. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 committee notes (1977 Revision). However, the writ of prohibition
provides an adequate remedy "in cases involving jurisdiction of the subject matter."
134. Rehrer v. Weeks, 106 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
135. State v. Herin, 80 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1955).
136. Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Pistorino v. Ferguson, 386 So. 2d
65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
137. Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
138. Columbo v. Legendre, 397 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court tried to cite for
contempt an individual who violated patently void order). Judgments of criminal contempt are final
appealable orders, Local Lodge Number 1248, International Ass'n of Machinists v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
125 So. 2d 337, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). Orders of civil contempt have been held to be subject to
interlocutory appeal. Langbert v. Langbert, 409 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). This holding
seems correct where the civil contempt order is entered to enforce an order subject to interlocutory appeal
under Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 1977 Revision. Otherwise, common law
certiorari may be the appropriate method of review. See, e.g., Alger v. Peters, 88 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1956).
139. Department of Natural Resources v. Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, 317 So. 2d
772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
140. 348 So. 2d at 296.
141. Id at 297.
142. See C. Wright, supra note 31, § 101, at 707.
143. For an excellent discussion of the law of common law certiorari in Florida, including Florida law
governing review of decisions of Circuit Courts sitting in their appellate capacity, see Haddad, The Common
Law Writ of Certiorari" n Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 207 (1977).
144. See Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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rule. 145 The writ is an extraordinary remedy available only in exceptional circum-
stances where justice requires immediate appellate review unavailable by any
other remedy. 146
The Advisory Committee for the 1977 Revision of the Florida Rules of Appel-
late Procedure expressed the opinion that, since the "most urgent interlocutory
orders" are appealable under Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, there would be very few cases where common law certiorari would provide
relief. 14 7 This prognosis, however, is subject to question.
The decision to grant or deny a writ of certiorari is within the sound discretion
of the appellate court. 14  This discretion generally will be exercised in favor of
granting review by certiorari under the following standards:
[The] court will review an interlocutory order ... only under exceptional circumstances.
Where it clearly appears that there is no full, adequate and complete remedy by appeal
after final judgment available to the petitioner, this court will consider granting the writ, as
where the lower court acts without and in excess of its jurisdiction or the order does not
conform to essential requirements of law and may cause material injury throughout subse-
quent proceedings for which the remedy by appeal will be inadequate.
14 9
XIII
BASES OF COMMON LAW CERTIORARI
A. Action in Excess of Jurisdiction
Where a trial court acts in excess of its jurisdiction by, for example, granting a
plaintiff's motion to set aside a voluntary dismissal after the court has lost jurisdic-
tion over the case,' 50 or erroneously transferring a case which was properly within
its jurisdiction to another court which was without jurisdiction over the case,' 5 1
common law certiorari will lie.' 52 This rule reflects the high value placed on lim-
iting a court to its proper jurisdiction and has its counterpart in the rule, discussed
above, which authorizes the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent in advance
a wrongful exercise of a court's jurisdiction. 153
145. Wright v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 287 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
146. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1957).
147. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 committee notes (1977 Revision); Malone v. Costin, 410 So. 2d 569, 570
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
148. Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983); Kauffman v. King, 89 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1956);
Kilgore v. Bird, 149 Fla. 570, 6 So. 2d 541 (1942). This discretion should be exercised only when there is a
violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Combs v. State, 436
So. 2d at 96.
149. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1957).
150. See, e.g., Tinsley v. McDonald, 378 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Sun First Nat'l Bank v.
Green Crane & Concrete Servs., Inc., 371 So. 2d 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); cf. Heston v. Vitale, 432 So.
2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an order reinstating a cause of action for corporate plaintiffs
who had filed a notice of voluntary dismissal was reviewable by prohibition).
151. See, e.g., Norris v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 324 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Mendoza v. Farrell, 199 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
152. In Stark v. Regency Highland Condominium Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), a
discovery order directed to an out of state witness was quashed partially on the basis that the court had no
jurisdiction over that witness under the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.251 (West
1979).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 127-42.
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B. Departure from the Essential Requirements of Law Which Result in Harm
Not Remediable by Appeal from Final Judgment
1. Departure from EssentialRequirements of Law. The Florida cases do not provide a
very precise definition of what constitutes a departure from the essential require-
ments of law, as one court has readily admitted. 54 The process of deciding
whether the trial court's order represents such a departure requires the courts to
"scrutinize the facts and circumstances of each particular case when making this
determination." 55
Despite the considerable uncertainty in the definition and application of this
standard, certain features of the standard have been recognized in theory, if not
always in practice. First, to qualify as a departure from the essential requirements
of law, the error must be a fundamental one. 156 The concept of fundamental error
was defined in Ci/o of Winter Park v. Jones as follows:
An error must be so flagrant and of such magnitude that a party has been effectively denied
his day in court before our certiorari jurisdiction will be invoked. Even though a nonfunda-
mental error should cause reversal in the circuit court it will not prompt our certiorarijurisdiction. 157
The above requirements, that the error be glaring and of such a nature that it will,
unless corrected, cause harm in the proceedings to the rights of the party against
whom it is made, are consistent with the exceptional circumstances test of common
law certiorari. 58 A glaring, flagrant, or substantial error is easily identifiable by
an appellate court without great effort or expenditure of time. In addition to the
requirement that the error be fundamental, an error must also present a clear
departure from the essential requirments of law in order to qualify for certiorari
review. 159 The fact that early appellate court action may prevent manifest injus-
tice provides a justification for intruding into the trial court's conduct of the case.
The recent past provides some examples of fundamental errors deemed signifi-
cant enough to warrant the grant of certiorari. The cases involve trial judges
whose errors include: refusing to approve a settlement between parties,' 6 0 granting
a protective order which prevented the taking of a defendant's attorney's deposi-
tion, 16 ' denying the right to take the testimony of an alleged material witness 162
154. City of Winter Park v. Jones, 392 So. 2d 568, 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); see also Combs v.
State, 436 So. 2d (Fla. 1983). An incorrect decision on subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error.
Stel-Den of America, Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc. 438 So. 2d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
155. Zediker v. State, 218 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). "Since it is impossible to list all
possible legal errors serious enough to constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law, the
district courts must be allowed a large degree of discretion so that they may judge each case individually."
Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 95-96 (Fla. 1983).
156. Chicken 'N' Things v. Murray, 329 So. 2d 302, 304 (Fla. 1976).
157. 392 So. 2d 568, 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also Girten v. Bouvier, 155 So. 2d 745, 749
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). "In granting writs of common law certiorari, the district courts of appeal should
not be as concerned with the mere existence of legal error as much as with the seriousness of the error."
Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d at 95.
158. See Leithauser v. Harrison, 168 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
159. Venezia A., Inc. v. Askew, 314 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
160. Bullard v. Sharp, 407 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
161. Young, Stern & Tannenbaum, P.A. v. Smith, 416 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Man-
damus, however, has been used to require production of materials claimed to be protected by the Florida
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and denying a right to arbitration. 63 These cases provide examples of flagrant
errors.
Many of the trial court errors corrected by common law certiorari, however, do
not appear to have been particularly flagrant or as pervasive in their harmful
effect as required by the definition of fundamental error stated in City of Winter
Park. Yet, such trial court errors may have caused harm of a type that was not
subject to adequate remedy by appeal. This dilemma demonstrates that an appel-
late court must not only determine, in the abstract, whether a trial court error is
serious enough to require review by common law certiorari, but it must also
measure the impact the legal ruling has in the particular case considered. An
examination of the particularized harmful effects of an erroneous trial court ruling
is necessary to determine whether the error should qualify for review by common
law certiorari. 164
2. Material Injutr Not Subj'ect to Remedy By AppeaZ As a general rule, the burden
and expense of a needless trial that would result from an erroneous interlocutory
order is not the kind of injury that will support the granting of a petition for
certiorari. 65 The reason given for this general rule is that allowing such harm to
be the basis for obtaining interlocutory review of an erroneous order would create
the potential for excessive interlocutory review of trial court orders and defeat the
purposes of the final order rule.' 66
The type of special injury needed to support a grant of common law certiorari
often results from orders requiring discovery of matters beyond the scope of legiti-
mate discovery or shielded by a privilege. 167 Courts granted certiorari in many of
the earlier leading cases to prevent such harm on the theory that once the disclo-
sure of the protected information is compelled, the invasion of the privacy right or
privilege involved cannot be remedied adequately on appeal. 168 Recent cases con-
tinue to apply this principle not only to discovery orders directed to a party, 169 but
also to orders directed to nonparties. Nonparties are said to be irreparably harmed
for both the reason applying to parties and because, as nonparties, they cannot
Public Records Act. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011 (West 1982); Edelstein v. Donner, 450 So. 2d.562 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
162. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hill, 388 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
163. See Lapidus v. Arlen Beach Condominium Ass'n, 394 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
Effective January 1, 1985, such orders will be reviewable by appeal under Fla. R. App. P. 9.130
(a) (3) (C) (v).
164. See Girten v. Bouvier, 155 So. 2d 745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
165. See Santini Bros. v. Grover, 338 So. 2d 79, 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Wright v. Sterling Drugs,
Inc., 287 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
166. See Siegel v. Abramowitz, 309 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Girten v. Bouvier, 155 So. 2d
745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
167. See, e.g., Fortune Personnel Agency of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc. v. Sun Tech, Inc., 423 So. 2d 545 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (protection of trade secrets); City of Williston v. Roadlander, 425 So. 2d II 75 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (work product); Gadsden County Times, Inc. v. Horne, 426 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (disclosure of confidential sources).
168. See, e.g., Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Kilgore v. Bird, 149 Fla. 570, 6 So. 2d 541
(1942). But see Sanders v. Impellitier, 291 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
169. See, e.g., Powell v. Wingard, 402 So. 2d 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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appeal from the final judgment entered in the case. 170
Although discovery orders comprise perhaps the largest category of orders in
which certiorari has been granted,' 7' there exist other cases which involve a special
harm of such significance that a reviewing court will grant certiorari. Examples of
these cases include instances where a court's order: (1) had a harmful effect on the
alienability of a party's real property because of the wrongful denial of a petition
to discharge a notice of lis pendens; 72 (2) unduly burdened a party by forcing him
to serve a notice of a pleading on 390 defendants; 7 3 and (3) harmed a foreign
corporation by improperly requiring it to comply with an inapplicable registration
statute and, in the interim, by staying the corporation's mortgage foreclosure
action.' 74 These,cases support the proposition that a special harm must be shown
by a petitioner.
The special type of harm evident in the foregoing cases, however, is not always
a precondition to granting review by common law certiorari. In Kauffnan v.
King,'7 5 the Florida Supreme Court expressly departed from the general rule
requiring special harm, holding that because petitioner's remedy by appeal from
an adverse venue ruling was inadequate, common law certiorari was proper. 76
The court in Kauffinan decided it would be "palpably unjust" to require the peti-
tioner/defendant to incur the expense and inconvenience of defending a suit in
both Dade and Palm Beach Counties. 77 Although a ruling of this sort on venue is
now subject to interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a) (3) (A) of the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure and therefore no longer reviewable by common law certio-
rari, the holding in Kaufinan is still significant since it evidences an express recogni-
tion by the Florida Supreme Court that an appeal in some circumstances does not
provide an adequate remedy for the damage caused by a needless trial which
results from trial court error.
Common law certiorari also has been granted in a criminal case upon consider-
ations of cost and expense to the public, in general, as well as to the litigants. In
State ex rel. Christian v. Rudd.178 the court commented:
Should we now refuse to act, deferring consideration until an appeal following trial should
there be a conviction, the only practical result would be the great expense of time and
money incurred by the Relator as well as the public. We are ever mindful of the great tax
burden placed upon those who support our government and prefer to relieve them of undue
expenses whenever feasible. Too, the achieving ofjustice is the primary responsibility of the
courts. We exercise our discretion and grant common law certiorari. 179
170. See, e.g., Palmer v. Servis, 393 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Fritz v. Norflor Constr. Co.,
386 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
171. See Haddad, supra note 143, at 227.
172. Cooper Village, Inc. v. Moretti, 383 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Hallmark Mfg., Inc. v.
Lujack Constr. Co., 372 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
173. Clark v. Inman, 379 So. 2d 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
174. Batavia, Ltd. v. United States, 393 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); see also Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Jackson, 445 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (burden and expense of answering
numerous interrogatories).
175. 89 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1956).
176. Id.
177. Id
178. 302 So. 2d 821 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
179. Id at 824.
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In addition to these express statements that common law certiorari will lie, in
certain circumstances, to prevent the burden and expense of a needless trial, there
are numerous other cases implicitly recognizing this principle. Whether these cases
are simply violations of the general rule that the damage of a needless trial is
insufficient to support common law certiorari, or are proper exceptions to the rule,
depends upon a determination of how broadly defined should be the scope of dis-
cretionary review under certiorari, especially in light of the policies supporting
exceptions to the final order rule. Cases permitting common law certiorari,
without requiring special harm of the type discussed above, appear to fall into
several categories. One group of cases involves the review of interlocutory orders
affecting questions of great public importance and which require an immediate
and definitive answer.180 A second group of cases involve orders having an impact
on important rights' 8 1 such as the right to arbitration, a2 the right of a criminal
defendant to be heard in person or by counsel, 8 3 and the right of the media to
gain access to public records and proceedings. 1 4 These cases do not require the
showing of special harm.
One other fundamental right held to justify the granting of common law certi-
orari without the requirement of special injury is the right to trial by jury. 1 5 In
this regard, the court in Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc. 186 said:
In the present case, the denial of the right to jury trial is more than the denial of a
constitutional right; it is the denial of a fundamental right recognized prior to the adoption
of a written constitution. The right to select the peers to which one's cause will be sub-
mitted is unique and indispensible to the adversary system. For this reason, we deem certio-
rari to be the appropriate remedy in this instance. If we are accused of granting special
dispensation by the review of this type order, then our critics can take solace in the fact that
there will be few instances where litigants will present to us similar problems of such great
consequence. 1
8 7
Other decisions constituting exceptions to the general rule requiring special
injury to support a grant of certiorari are more difficult to classify. One court has
180. Se, Rich v. Harper Neon Co., 124 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (procedure used in
eminent domain proceedings throughout the state); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ballinger, 312 So. 2d 249 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (issue of importance under the comparative negligence doctrine); Desert Ranches of
Florida, Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 406 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(constitutionality of a state statute authorizing the levying of state ad valorem taxes).
181. In Bloomhuff v. Miami Jockey Club, Inc., 150 Fla. 411,413, 7 So. 2d 447, 448 (1942), the court
stated that certiorari "affords relief in those extraordinary cases where the remedy afforded by Sec. 4,
Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, for injury done a person in his lands, person or reputation is
insufficiently afforded by the more common form of procedure."
182. Lapidus v. Arlen Beach Condominium Ass'n, 394 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court
recognizes strong public policy favoring arbitration but denies certiorari based on facts).
183. Hall v. Oakley, 409 So. 2d 93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Review by certiorari also has been used
to review orders relating to the disqualification of counsel. Fitzpatrick v. Smith, 432 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Endress v. Coe, 433 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Beth S. v. Grant Assoc., Inc.,
426 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
184. News-Press Publishing Co. v. Gadd, 388 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
185. Magram v. Raffel, 443 So. 2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc., 421
So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Freedman v. Rosin, 394 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Sara-
sota-Manatee Airport Auth. v. Alderman, 238 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Conlra Lindsey v.
Sherman, 402 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
186. 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
187. Id. at 47-48.
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held, for example, that an order refusing to approve a settlement is reviewable by
common law certiorari.""' The importance of encouraging settlements of cases is
perhaps an important policy consideration involved in this decision.
Cases have also held that an order denying a motion to join certain defend-
ants,18 9 an order refusing to dismiss a third party complaint,19° and an order
denying a motion for leave to amend an answer to include a compulsory counter-
claim 91 are reviewable by certiorari. These cases, however, seem clearly inconsis-
tent with the policies which underlie Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and more recent cases have held to the contrary.192
Moreover, in at least two cases, courts have held that an order preventing the
taking of the deposition of a material witness was subject to review by common
law certiorari19 3 even though the facts in these cases disclosed that the only
apparent injury involved was the burden and expense of a needless trial. In one of
these cases, the need to develop the law of discovery on an important issue, one
that might not be presented on appeal from the final judgment, seemed to be an
important consideration in the decision to grant common law certiorari.1 94
The cases discussed above suggest a broader rule for common law certiorari as
a method of discretionary interlocutory review. While the generally stated rule is
that, except where the court acts in excess of its jurisdiction, common law certio-
rari will lie only where a trial court order (1) departs from the essential require-
ments of law, and (2) causes injury not subject to adequate remedy by appeal after
final judgment, courts actually use common law certiorari more frequently than
the rule suggests.
XIV
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMON LAW CERTIORARI AND RULE 9.130 OF THE
FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The courts of Florida allow interlocutory appeal as of right of those nonfinal
orders specified in Rule 9.130.195 Discretionary interlocutory review of nonfinal
orders not included in Rule 9.130 may be available in exceptional circumstances
under the writ of common law certiorari.
There is a potential conflict between the apparent open texture of common law
certiorari and the policy of restricting interlocutory appeals reflected in Rule
9.130. Any expansion of common law certiorari should therefore be made cau-
tiously, keeping the policy of Rule 9.130 in mind.
188. Bullard v. Sharp, 407 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
189. See, e.g., Surette v. Galiardo, 309 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
190. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
191. See, e.g., Romish v. Albo, 291 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
192. Hawaiian Inn of Daytona Beach, Inc. v. Snead Constr. Corp., 393 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); see Malone v. Costin, 410 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
193. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hill, 388 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Young, Stern &
Tannenbaum, P.A. v. Smith, 416 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
194. Young, Stern & Tennanbaum, P.A. v. Smith, 416 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 100-08.
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XV
CONCLUSION
Florida's appellate law in civil cases provides for appellate review of all final
judgments or orders, but limits interlocutory review of nonfinal orders to those
specified in the interlocutory appeals rules or those meeting the stringent require-
ments for review by extraordinary writ. . 1 1
For the most part, this law properly balances the policies and interests which
support the final judgment rule and the competing policies and interests which
justify the allowance of interlocutory appellate review. The appellate decisions
reflect a genuine dedication by Florida appellate judges to preserving this proper
balance.
Florida's appellate law could be improved, nevertheless, by the adoption of
special rules governing appellate review of orders permitting or denying class
actions, since class actions often serve a vital public interest and create unique
problems of appellate review. Another improvement would be to adopt a rule
comparable to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing
appellate review of orders dismissing fewer than all of the claims or parties in a
case. Such a rule, by allowing a better weighing of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of delaying the appeal of such dismissals until the entry of final judgment
would be an improvement over what is currently available under Florida appellate
law.
These suggested improvements are not exhaustive; there is need for further
development in this dynamic area of law. An extremely important example is the
need for clarification of the principles governing the law of common law certiorari.
The complexity of the variables involved in determining whether an order in a
civil case should be subject to immediate appellate review or whether appellate
review of the order should be postponed until a final disposition of the case,
presents a continuing challenge of great significance to the Florida courts.
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